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1 Summary of mutual learning 
This learning resource is the outcome of the Platform Seminar on Letterbox Companies 
which took place on November 30th, 2017 in Brussels. The aim of the Seminar was to 
facilitate understanding of the nature of fraudulent letterbox companies and their links 
to undeclared work. Discussions focussed on the challenges of identifying and tackling 
fraudulent letterbox companies. The event brought together Platform members, 
including representatives of national ministries, labour inspectorates, social security 
authorities, and tax authorities - as well as European-level social partners and 
international organisations.  
This Learning Resource not only reports on the seminar discussion but augments it by 
reporting subsequent analysis of a survey of members of the Expert Committee on 
Posting of Workers (ECPW) and representatives of Member State social partners1.   
Key findings: 
Participants underlined the difficulty in defining, identifying and tackling fraudulent 
letterbox companies. As with past Platform events, there is consensus on the need to 
develop a coordinated and integrated approach to tackling fraudulent letterbox activity 
which requires strong working relationships between Member State government 
departments (e.g. tax and labour inspectorate departments). Accordingly, as with other 
sources of undeclared work, a joined-up and integrated response is essential to tackling 
fraudulent letterbox companies.  
 An opening challenge to regulating letterbox companies is the lack of an accepted 
definition or widespread understanding of this business form. The seminar 
established a need to define what is meant by a letterbox company in both lay 
and legal terms within and between Member States. This is a necessary 
precondition in priming enforcement institutions tasked with upholding worker 
rights which are undermined by these arrangements. Importantly, letterbox 
companies may be legal if they meet basic essential criteria for organisation and 
registration in a particular Member State.  
 A number of legislative changes were identified that could help to address the 
use of fraudulent letterbox companies. These include changes to the rules on the 
posting of workers, including changes to the rules specifying which Member State 
pays social security contributions on posted workers. For high risk sectors (i.e. 
those which often use letterbox activity), it is encouraged that social security 
contributions for those workers involved through posting arrangements should 
be paid in the receiving State.  
 There is a need to encourage both data-sharing and general forms of cooperation 
between regulatory institutions (e.g. tax authorities and labour inspectorates) 
both within and between Member States. In terms of the latter, Member States 
known to receive or send posted workers to one another should develop 
Memoranda of Understanding or equivalent cooperation mechanisms to help the 
detection of letterbox companies and address labour rights abuses.   
 The use of both public and private initiatives to address letterbox companies 
should be encouraged. This could include the use of accreditation schemes which 
endorse companies upholding worker rights through, for example, transparent 
supply chains and records of good practice.  
  
                                           
1 European Platform Undeclared Work (2017) Letterbox Companies Survey Report, October 2017.  
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2 Artificial company arrangements and undeclared labour 
Key questions:  
 How can we define letterbox companies? 
 How do letterbox companies facilitate undeclared work?  
2.1 Defining letterbox companies  
Discussions between Platform members and analysis of the survey results reveal that 
most Member States have no legal or working definition of letterbox companies, nor a 
legal definition of what constitutes a ‘genuine’ company. It was established at the 
Seminar that such a gap has led to difficulties in both tracking and tackling letterbox 
companies. In the absence of EU or Member State definitions for letterbox companies, 
the OECD Glossary of Tax Terms provides the following definition:  
Box 1: Letterbox company definition (OECD) 
Letterbox company: A paper company, shell company or money box company, i.e. a 
company which has complied only with the bare essentials for organisation and 
registration in a particular country. The actual commercial activities are carried out in 
another country (OECD Glossary of Tax Terms2). 
In lay terms, letterbox companies are businesses which exist via a mailing address only, 
with actual activities taking place elsewhere (i.e. in another Member State). Other 
names for letterbox companies include mailbox companies, paper companies, money-
box companies, brass-plate companies, shell companies and pro forma-companies. As 
became evident during the Seminar, the provision of labour through letterbox 
arrangements has led to a common theme of undeclared and under-declared work 
activities. Accordingly, a further useful definition is provided by Heinen et al. (2017) 
who note that letterbox firms are purposefully designed to circumvent legal obligations.3  
The same authors note that letterbox companies commonly comprise several local 
affiliates, or else a network of different companies in different Member States linked to 
the short-term subcontracting of labour. This often involves the subcontracting of labour 
and the use of posted workers through bogus letterbox companies. Such provision of 
employment solutions is often linked to undeclared work, while the ability for letterbox 
companies supplying labour to ‘disappear’ is shown to problematize efforts to 
regulate/control letterbox companies by respective Member State authorities.  
At the same time, it is important to state that letterbox companies may be legal if they 
meet basic essential criteria for organisation and registration in a particular Member 
State. However, if arrangements are found to be wholly artificial in nature (i.e. their 
activities in fact only take place elsewhere), then activities may be deemed fraudulent 
and subject to enforcement action. Establishing this requires well-developed inspection 
methods, enforcement activities and cooperation between institutions as the following 
resource makes clear.  
2.2 How letterbox companies facilitate undeclared work 
The link between letterbox companies and undeclared work is often (though not 
exclusively) linked to cross-border recruitment involving the posting of workers and/or 
the use of workers supplied through temping agencies (i.e. Temporary Work Agencies 
                                           
2 http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm 
3 A letterbox company is: (an) undertaking that is set up with the intention of circumventing legal 
and conventional obligations. Examples of these are taxation, social security, VAT and wages. 
These companies do not actually perform any real economic activities although claiming to do so 
(Heinen et al., 2017: 8). 
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or Labour Leasing Agencies; Eurofound, 2016)4.  These arrangements offer cost savings 
through the avoidance of tax/social obligations and other regulations (e.g. avoidance of 
collective bargaining agreements)5. Importantly, posted workers are legally employed 
in the Member State in which their company is based and posting firms and their workers 
pay social security contributions there and not in the host Member State. Crucially, 
posted workers are intended as a temporary staffing solution for firms (up to 24 
months), particularly those enduring a skills shortage during periods of high demand.  
In lay terms, fraudulent letterbox companies are commonly intended to subvert the 
rules on posting and cross-border recruitment, thus facilitating both undeclared and 
under-declared work arrangements. Seminar participants pointed to the use of letterbox 
firms to create false contractual frameworks between firms and fraudulent letterbox 
subcontractors with a view to benefiting from cost savings (i.e. labour/tax regulations 
of the Member State where the subcontractor is established). Companies have also been 
found to utilise false letterbox companies as a means of receiving posted or temporary 
agency workers as a permanent activity rather than a temporary service. As noted by 
Eurofound (2016: 18), ‘only the latter justifies the application of the terms of 
employment of the Member State where the subcontractor is established, in accordance 
with Directive 96/71/EC’. In the (often unlikely) event of an inspection, letterbox 
companies may easily close and reopen under another name.  
Research has uncovered a variety of labour law abuses facilitated by letterbox 
arrangements, including underpayment of wages, illegal overtime and punitive work 
conditions (discussed in greater depth in the Sector Challenges section; see Box 2). 
Crucially, labour inspectorates face the significant challenge of both investigating firms 
outside of their own Member State and holding employers to account, thus making it 
difficult to close down fraudulent letterbox operations.  
Box 2: Abuse of labour agency recruitment (based on Cremers, 2014) 
Significant labour abuses through fraudulent cross-border recruitment arose in 
Denmark, Sweden and Germany in 2013 in the case of international trucking. In this 
instance a German-Latvian agency recruited workers from the Philippines, claiming a 
shortage of skilled labour in Latvia meant non-EU workers were required. As soon as 
they entered Latvia the drivers were hired out to perform other undertakings in 
Europe. The company’s own financial statements recorded that the haulage contractor 
paid these drivers approximately €2.36 per hour. The company changed its name and 
undertook a series of bankruptcy and liquidation actions. None of the companies had 
the required tax certificate for contractors, and neither of the companies were 
registered as the employer.6  
 
  
                                           
4 A majority of Member States surveyed reported that letterbox companies involving the 
recruitment of workers to/from other Member States utilised posting arrangements. The ‘posting’ 
of workers may be defined as ‘any activity of an employee for his or her employer which is 
temporarily exercised outside the Member State where the employer normally carries out its 
activities.’ (ETUC 2016: 55). 
5 Eurofound (2016), Exploring the fraudulent contracting of work in the European Union, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 




3 Policy and legal framework  
Key questions:  
 What EU-wide and national legislation currently facilitates letterbox companies? 
 What legislation could be used to tackle undeclared work/letterbox activity?  
3.1 Freedoms which facilitate letterbox companies 
Letterbox companies utilise important EU freedoms, notably by the Freedom of 
Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services. The Freedom of Establishment 
(Article 52 of the EEC Treaty, Article 49 of the TFEU) is key in facilitating letterbox firms 
as it enshrines the right of individuals to establish a legal entity (a company) in one 
Member State whilst pursuing economic activities in another Member State with the 
same legal entity. The Freedom to Provide Services (Article 56 TFEU), meanwhile, allows 
the pursuit of an economic activity by a person or company in another Member State 
which does not have a principal or secondary place of business in that State7. These 
legal provisions, whilst pivotal to securing the Single Market, have allowed firms to make 
false residence claims. This comes with a view to avoiding taxation, social security and 
labour law requirements in the Member States they really work from.  
Importantly, a company which maintains wholly artificial arrangements may not rely on 
the ‘freedom to provide services’ rights to secure trading. Equally, those firms without 
real activities anywhere in the EU are not protected by rights of establishment or the 
freedom to provide services. 
Member States have more or less stringent laws which may apply to the regulation of 
letterbox companies and certain Seminar participants observed difficulties regulating 
corporate behaviour due to ambiguities over which law holds precedence: European 
social policy law or Company law8.  
A number of Freedom of Establishment cases have been tested at the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ)9. The mixed outcomes have proved inconclusive  viz. the legality of 
letterbox companies. The case of Centros (a wine import/export company) is regarded 
as a case in point, wherein company owners were successful in registering Centros in 
the UK for tax purposes whilst conducting operations in Denmark (see Paschalidis, 2012; 
Sørensen, 2014),10.  
3.2 Incorporation vs. Real Seat Theory 
Particular rules are in place which allow the creation of letterbox companies as legal 
entities. Distinct legal approaches have had an impact on the ability of different Member 
States to allow letterbox companies in theory and practice.  
                                           
7In addition, the Services Directive was enacted in 2006 to support the freedom to provide 
services As noted by Heinen et al. (2017: 27), the Services Directive ‘is considered a crucial 
instrument for developing and finally completing the internal market by introducing measures of 
administrative and regulatory simplification and modernization, by fostering cooperation among 
member states as well as enhancing and enforcing the rights of consumers and businesses’. 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157 
9 In the case of the Daily Mail (Daily Mail and General Trust plc vs. HM Treasury), the British 
newspaper attempted to transfer tax residence from the UK to the Netherlands in 1988, whilst 
maintaining a subsidiary/branch function in the UK. In this instance the Court ruled that the 
Freedom of Establishment did not confer to companies a right to transfer central management 
functions/control to another Member State, whilst at the same time retaining status as 
incorporated in the home Member State9. By contrast, cases such as Centros (1999) and 
Überseering (2002) have provided opposite rulings and so mixed messages regarding 
the legality of letterbox arrangements. 
10 Danish law required companies to pay a minimum share capital price of 200,000 Kroner, 
whereas the UK minimum capital requirement was just £1.  
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Member States may for example draw on the theory of incorporation when appraising 
the legality of a corporation. Under this approach companies are held to account by the 
rules of the country where the firm was incorporated. By contrast, other legal systems 
are more likely to rely on Real Seat Theory, which provides that the place where the 
central administration and substantial activities of that company are located  (i.e. its 
principal place of business) is key in determining which company law system applies to 
company relationships. This rule requires companies to maintain operational 
headquarters within a given Member State in order to be established under the laws of 
that State.  
The different systems have impacts on tackling letterbox companies and companies 
attempting to shift operations into new Member States. Hence, under the ‘Incorporation’ 
theory, companies may be officially “incorporated” or registered in a Member State 
which is different from the state in which they are really active, paving the way for firms 
to operate with minimal attachments (e.g. a mere letterbox address) in the country in 
which they are formally incorporated. 
3.3 Posted workers  
Outside of the contested right to establish letterbox companies per se, the rules 
surrounding posted workers and the use of temporary workers (i.e. those channelled 
via agencies) have created many of the problems linking letterbox companies to 
undeclared work (Tacu, 2012; Tacu, 2015). Posted and temporary workers are 
appealing to companies not just as a labour solution but also as a means of avoiding 
certain applications of the law of the state of employment. This advantage refers to 
specific rules governing how posted workers in particular are taxed. Exceptions to the 
application of the law of the state-of-employment (lex loci laboris) apply to posted 
workers and situations in which workers operate in two or more Member States (ETUC 
2016: 54; McGauran, 2016). As a result, companies which use posted workers can take 
advantage of differences in social security contribution levels between Member States.  
By design, posted worker exemptions were intended to remove administrative burdens 
on workers, employers and social security institutions. In practice the arrangement has 
led to a myriad of false letterbox companies which exist in paper terms only as a means 
of delivering a cheap workforce. Workers channelled through letterbox arrangements 
are often not declared to social security offices and/or tax departments, while under-
declared forms of work include failures to pay the minimum salary of the host country 
and/or failure to pay overtime.  
Crucially, the freedom of movement of workers does not apply to posted workers. 
Instead, the employer is seen to make use of the freedom to provide services by sending 
their own workers to another Member State on a temporary basis. Posted workers are 
subsequently protected by the Posted Workers Directive (PWD) which provides certain 
terms and conditions of employment in the host state. In addition, the Enforcement 
Directive is intended to restrict the undercutting of local service providers. There are a 
number of rules which are designed to prevent the abuse of posted workers (see also 
Cremers, 2011 and 2016): 
Box 3: Rules designed to prevent the abuse of posted workers  
Directive 96/71/EC1 (the Posting of Workers Directive) formulates basic rules: 
- undertakings post workers to the territory of a Member State on their 
account and under their direction, provided there is an employment 
relationship between the undertaking making the posting and the worker 
during the period of posting (‘organic bond’); 
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- the undertaking normally carries on activities in the sending State 
(‘requirement of genuine performance of substantial activities’);11  
- a posted worker means a worker who, for a limited period, carries out his 
work in the territory of a Member State other than the State in which he 
normally works for his undertaking (‘requirement of previous attachment and 
habitual workplace’); 
- the definition of a worker is that which applies in the law of the Member 
State to whose territory the worker is posted (tackling ‘bogus-self-
employment’; Heyes and Hastings, 2017); 
- the Directive formulates a hard core of terms and conditions of employment 
that have to be respected (‘avoid distortion of competition’); 
- cooperation between the public authorities, which are responsible for 
monitoring the terms and conditions of employment shall in particular consist 
in replying to reasoned requests from those authorities for information on the 
transnational hiring-out of workers, including manifest abuses or possible 
cases of unlawful transnational activities. 
 
Reform of the PWD is viewed by many as necessary in tackling letterbox companies and 
the undeclared work/labour abuses which commonly emerge through the practice of 
posting. In the absence of reform, the need to regulate and monitor posted workers has 
led to ad hoc solutions by certain Member States. For example, the Estonian Employees 
Register (TÖR) which is used to register natural/legal persons employed in Estonia does 
not apply at once to posted workers, and instead posted workers are registered by 
emails to the Labour Inspectorate of Estonia.  
  
                                           
11 The aspect of substantial activities was more explicitly formulated in the posting rules 
settled in Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 on the coordination of social security. 
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4 Company strategies and sector challenges 
Key questions:  
 What are the main company strategies for facilitating undeclared/fraudulent 
labour arrangements via letterbox companies? 
4.1 Types of letterbox schemes and business models 
The distribution and scale of letterbox companies across the EU is difficult to measure. 
Survey results reveal that only five Member States use indicators to measure the level 
of letterbox company activity; while only two Member States attempt to estimate the 
overall scale of unlawful letterbox company activity. In terms of their distribution across 
sectors, feedback suggests that letterbox company activity is concentrated in the 
construction sector12, although research by the ETUC has uncovered a variety of labour 
rights violations as linked to the fraudulent use of letterbox companies in other areas. 
Detailed case studies include a focus on meat, transport and construction industries 
involving different Member States.  
The deregulation of company law has helped in the creation of letterbox companies, 
allowing individuals to form companies (whether real or ‘fake’, letterbox or otherwise) 
quickly and at low cost (Cremers, 2017). In doing so a window has been created for 
individuals to create false letterbox companies providing labour solutions to companies, 
or else company owners themselves may register their own letterbox subsidiaries in 
other Member States. Importantly these schemes are commonly established following 
advice by business/legal consultants who are able to advise on the legality of 
arrangements and the difficulty national inspectorates face in regulating letterbox 
company arrangements (including verifying A1 forms registered in another Member 
State). As noted by Cremers (2017) ‘it is almost impossible for a country confronted 
with the presence of an artificial entity to have the registration withdrawn in the country 
of registration; and this is certainly not a competence of the inspectorate’ (pg. 17).  
ETUC research has focussed on cheap labour in construction, transport, cleaning, care 
work (e.g. in the case of Germany). Other sectors have resulted in new posting 
arrangements between countries. In the course of the Seminar Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland were found to circulate a high number of posted workers to other Member 
States13. Ireland, however, did note an interesting case of fictitious letterbox companies 
being used to help secure employment permits for otherwise illegal workers drawn from 
the Indian subcontinent. Examples have also been reported at a major Belgian car 
producing company which utilised Bulgarian subcontractors to employ 316 Romanian, 
Bulgarian and Czech nationals (ETUC, 2016b).  
4.2 Impacts on workers’ rights 
The impacts on workers’ rights stemming from fraudulent labour arrangements are 
numerous. Presentations from Member States included evidence of undeclared work 
where workers are not declared to social security offices and tax departments. 
Participants also noted common issues of under-declared work in terms of a lack of 
overtime payments and underpayment of minimum salaries within letterbox 
                                           
12 For instance, a Belgian study published by the employers’ organisation in construction 
(Confédération Construction) detailed two forms of abuse of the freedom to provide services. The 
first included the use of posting with the suggestion that the posting firm delivers services with 
recruits hired via a foreign letterbox company. The second involved the use of bogus self-
employed or pseudo subsidiaries abroad through subcontracting (Lanove, 2013: 104) 
13 Estonia was observed to have received a large number of Ukrainian and Belarusian workers 
who are commonly paid on the Estonian minimum wage despite the fact contractor bills involve 
far higher remuneration.   
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arrangements. More problems were reported in terms of the conditions of workers within 
letterbox arrangements.  
Since the late 1990s court convictions have helped illustrate the illegal/fraudulent 
potential of letterbox firms and their impacts on worker rights. Early cases in the late 
1990s included a spotlight on the international transport sector with knock-on effects 
including instances of ‘bogus self-employment’14, tax evasion and the circumvention of 
statutory pay and working time rules.  
In one case a Luxembourg court forced a firm that had permanently changed its name 
to alter the self-employed status of its drivers into an employment status15. A further 
example of a similar case settled at a Dutch court is provided in Box 4. 
Box 4: Verifying artificial intermediaries in Cyprus 
In 2011 several transport companies in the Benelux countries received the offer to 
transfer their workforces to intermediate companies located in Cyprus and 
Liechtenstein. In doing so the firms agreed to operate as ‘clients’ who would receive 
an invoice for supply of services, whilst the truck drivers would continue to work de 
facto for the original employer. By opening an office abroad the intermediates claimed 
that it was justifiable to offer a Cypriot employment contract to the truckers, even 
though they did not live there and never visited the island.  
A Dutch Court stated in 2015 that this so-called Cyprus firm, owned by a Dutch 
businessman, could not be seen as the employer. The transfer was thus acknowledged 
as an artificial arrangement that led to a circumvention of employers’ obligations in 
the field of taxation and social security. The Dutch competent authority for social 
security (SVB) concluded that this was an illegal activity, with the verdict confirmed 
after appeal in March 2016.16 
Recent ETUC research has uncovered further cases of fraudulent letterbox activity within 
the meat, transport and construction industries across the EU. In the case of the meat 
industry, German firms were found to have relocated large parts of their business to 
take advantage of low cost Eastern European workers sourced via a web of letterbox 
subcontractors with links to Poland, Hungary and Romania as well as Germany17. On 
close inspection subcontractors were found to operate short-lived letterbox structures 
(e.g. up to six months before closure and reforming) registered in Eastern Europe. 
Workers were also found not to be employed by the same company for more than six 
months, with contracts commonly passing from one letterbox company to another within 
the same ownership chain. Through this strategy the employment relationship was 
obscured, restricting access to justice for workers (e.g. in cases of underpayment). Box 
2 provided already some examples; a summary of other labour issues linked to this 
model is included in Box 5.  
Box 5: Examples of letterbox labour issues in the meat industry (Germany) 
 Working hours: 14-20 hours per day 
 Salary: €700-900 per month 
                                           
14 Heyes, J and Hastings, T (2017) The Practices of Enforcement Bodies in Detecting and 
Preventing Bogus Self-Employment, Report prepared for the European Platform on Undeclared 
Work 
15 http://paperjam.lu/communique/affaire-kralowetz-reaction-du-ministere-des-transports  
16 The Dutch verdict: 
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2016:1638  
17 For a discussion on the impact of subcontracting on worker rights, see Weil (2014). 
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 Lack of holiday pay, sick pay or overtime pay 
 No social premiums: workers lose pension/health insurance coverage 
 Punitive work conditions, including fines (e.g. when meat is incorrectly cut) 
 Bribery from certain subcontractors making use of labour 
Other case studies have uncovered the use of letterbox firms linked to subcontractor 
chains in the transport sector. Investigations into a Dutch transport firm, for example, 
found a rising use of foreign workers (in particular Romanian and Lithuanian) recruited 
through subsidiary companies as a means of circumventing social security and sick pay 
contributions18. A number of red flags were established which suggest that this 
arrangement involved fake letterbox arrangements. For instance, company 
management were found to direct instructions to staff from their base in the 
Netherlands; drivers were surprisingly required to open Dutch bank accounts to receive 
wages; while on inspection one Romanian company was traced to a private house19.   
As with the meat industry examples, this use of letterbox companies facilitated 
poor/illegal working standards, including instances of underpayment of wages (e.g. 
rates of €200/month), bonus inducements for drivers to perform illegally high travel 
distances, and rest breaks in vehicles. Such forms of contract abuse are a common 
feature of fraudulent letterbox companies which develop little to no economic activity 
through the use of subcontractor relationships with companies abroad. When workers 
seek to claim wages, or enforcement agents pursue inspection cases, firms commonly 
disappear before resurfacing under another name/contract20 (Heinen et al. (2017: 69).  
  
                                           
18 This comes despite the use of specific EU law to regulate transport (e.g. Regulation 1071/2009) 
which are intended to establish common rules removing the advantage of letterbox firms.  
19 The ETUC also found evidence of social dumping through letterbox subcontracting in the 
construction industry. This case study focussed on migrant workers recruited through a temporary 
work/consultancy agency registered in Poland/operating under Polish law viz. subcontracting 
arrangements. The firm was found to make no social security contributions in either Poland or 
Sweden. Recent legal action resulted in an out of court settlement in which the Polish owner paid 






5 Policies to tackle undeclared work resulting from fraudulent 
letterbox companies 
Key questions 
 What are policy solutions currently in place to tackle UDW resulting from letterbox 
companies?    
 How can enforcement be improved across Member States (e.g. enforcement of 
the Posting of Workers Directive, consistent use of evidence, encouraging cross-
border collaboration between inspectorates and unions)? 
This section focuses on policy/regulatory solutions which are currently designed to 
restrict undeclared work linked to fraudulent letterbox companies. The section includes 
a discussion of joint/chain liability schemes as a means of improving conditions for 
subcontracted labour, prior to a discussion of regulations for posted workers.  
5.1 Tackling undeclared work through joint liability and chain liability 
schemes 
The regulation of subcontractors and labour market intermediaries is acknowledged as 
key to tackling labour abuses via letterbox companies. In recent years several Member 
States have adopted important legislation for tackling labour abuses which are hidden 
in supply chains. The Fair Labour Association (FLA) reports that since 2010 eight 
national/regional legal and regulatory initiatives were enacted globally to hold 
companies responsible for tracing and providing oversight of their supply chains. In 
France this includes the Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law which requires certain 
companies to establish plans to monitor their company supply chains for human rights 
violations and to implement a vigilance plan21. Similarly, in the UK the Modern Slavery 
Act requires companies with a turnover threshold of £36 million who have part of their 
business in the UK to publish a statement setting out steps taken to ensure there is no 
modern slavery in their supply chains.  
Different Member States have different chain liability schemes. In Belgium, for example, 
there is ‘complete’ chain liability in nine sectors including construction. Chain liability 
starts two weeks after a letter is sent informing companies of the investigation (e.g. an 
investigation may explore the payment of a minimum salary requirement). However, 
liability begins two weeks after this letter is sent and it is not possible to pursue 
backdated claims before this point. On receipt of a chain liability letter, contracts with 
foreign firms (i.e. subcontractors) are frequently terminated and arrangements with 
new companies are put in place thus foiling the inspection aims. Chain liability 
agreements are not covered in collective bargaining agreements; rather it is left to the 
labour inspectorate to start liability investigations.  
Subcontracting liability has both a preventative and deterrent effect by offering 
incentives to contractors to choose subcontractors carefully (Heinen et al., 2017). Under 
joint/several liabilities, if a subcontractor does not fulfil their obligations regarding 
wages, taxes, social funds payments etc. then the contractor of the subcontractor can 
be held liable for the debt. Wider chain liabilities may also incorporate the investor/client 
at the very top of this arrangement, through forms of ‘full chain liability’. Such systems 
may thus be seen to encourage self-regulation between private actors which may be 
less restrictive than state intervention methods (e.g. via inspections and sanctions). As 
noted, labour market intermediaries such as leasing agencies and temporary work 
                                           
21 This applies for companies headquartered in France employing more than 5,000 workers in 






agencies commonly work as subcontractors which support letterbox firms. Recent 
legislative amendments in many States have resulted in more or less elaborated 
systems of joint/several liabilities with respect to upholding wage and labour conditions 
for those engaged through subcontractors (Heinen et al., 2017: 18), though such 
systems are not considered widespread throughout the EU (see Jorens et al.22). Other 
efforts to regulate temporary work agencies include updated national registration and 
licensing schemes (as applied to TAW agencies)23.  
5.2 The posting of workers 
It should be noted that specific measures are in place for upholding the rights of posted 
workers, which are again of strong relevance in regulating bogus letterbox companies. 
With regards to tackling the illegitimate use of posted workers in letterbox companies, 
Directive 2014/67/EU (the ‘Enforcement Directive) was adopted in 2014. Article 4 of the 
Directive includes an assessment of genuine establishments based on a number of 
elements, with the test designed to identify where the core activities of an enterprise 
actually take place24.  
Box 6: The role of Directive 2014/67/EU (the Enforcement Directive)  
The Enforcement Directive specifies further enforcement rules, including measures to 
prevent and sanction any abuse and circumvention of the applicable rules: 
 The competent authorities shall make an overall assessment of all factual 
elements, in order to determine whether an undertaking genuinely performs 
substantial activities25.  
 In order to determine whether a posted worker temporarily carries out his work 
in a Member State other than the one in which he or she normally works, the 
competent authorities shall make an overall assessment of all factual elements 
(e.g. the period of posting, the start of the work and the return after 
completion, the nature of activities, travel and lodging);  
 Any previous period during which the post was filled by the same or another 
(posted) workers has to be checked (‘replacement ban’); 
 Whether a person falls within the applicable definition of a worker has to be 
guided by the facts relating to the performance of work, subordination and the 
remuneration of the worker, notwithstanding how the relationship is 
characterised in any arrangement, whether contractual or not, that may have 
been agreed between the parties;  
 A list of obligations that may be imposed on undertakings is formulated such 
as identity and number of workers, the beginning, duration and end of a 
posting period, the nature of the services, mandatory documents and written 
proofs, and the presence of a contact person;  
                                           
22 See Jorens/Peters/Houwerzijl, Study on the protection of workers’ rights in subcontracting 
processes in the European Union. Project DG EMPL/B2-VC/2011/0015.   
23 Heinen et al (2017) have found similarities between Member States in the use of 
registration/licensing schemes, while restrictions to the use of TAW vary markedly. 
24 In order to determine whether an undertaking genuinely performs substantial activities, other 
than purely internal management and/or administrative activities, the competent authorities 
make an overall assessment of all factual elements characterising those activities, taking account 
of a wider timeframe, carried out by an undertaking in the Member State of establishment, and 
where necessary, in the host Member State.  
25 This includes examples such as the place of the registered office, the location of recruitment, 
offices and administration, tax and social security contributions, licenses; employment contracts 
and commercial contracts and the applicable law related to the posting; the ordinary place of the 




 the specification of acceptable inspections and risk assessments;   
 Member States shall work in close cooperation and provide each other with 
mutual assistance and recognition in all enforcement matters.  
Policy suggestions were raised at the Seminar to better address letterbox companies 
and subsequent forms of undeclared work. Certain participants advised abolishing 
exceptions to the lex loci laboris rule (the state-of-employment principle, i.e. the law of 
the habitual place of work). This would mean applying the law of the country where the 
worker is physically performing for workers who are posted. In addition, longer periods 
of previous social insurance in the sending state (i.e. more than one month) may help 
to reduce the incentive to use posted worker arrangements via letterbox arrangements. 
In addition, participants raised concerns over the ease with which employers may utilise 
A1 forms (formerly E101, which certifies that a worker may be posted up to a specific 
date). It was advised that workers should be made aware of the use of A1 forms, their 
rights, and subsequent implications in relation to social security contributions and 
coverage.  
Survey respondents were mixed on the effectiveness of the Internal Market Information 
(IMI) System designed to facilitate cross-national cooperation between posting States. 
Half of all survey respondents found IMI effective in supporting investigations and 
executing sanctions or fines. Box 6 (above) provides an example of how Article 4 of the 
Enforcement Directive is applied in the case of Belgium.  
5.3 The regulation of tax including social security contributions 
Participants agreed that the fullest and most effective solutions are likely to require 
inputs from experts in taxation, company law, social security and labour law. Other 
recommendations included changes to the rules on who collects social security 
contributions. Inspectorates have no powers to collect social security contributions from 
workers technically based in other Member States. If however it were the responsibility 
of a host state for certain high-risk sectors/regions prone to collect social security 
contributions then this may remove some of the incentives to channel workers through 
bogus letterbox firms. Other participant recommendations include the following: 
 A harmonised definition of what amounts to company ‘residence’ is encouraged 
at EU level, which may be determined on the basis of profit/turnover criteria on 
the territory of a Member State.  
 There is a need to assist the collection of contributions in Member States which 
lack advanced electronic administrative systems.  
Improvements to resources and more information sharing between Member States’ 
social security institutions and inspectorates were also encouraged at the Seminar. 
According to participants this is necessary to ensure regulatory institutions have 
sufficient resources to identify UDW as linked to letterbox activity.   
5.4 Non-government solutions 
Outside of government-led inspection and enforcement, Seminar participants 
underscored a role for private regulatory solutions. This included encouragement for the 
role of industry trade associations which are seen to encourage legitimate practices (e.g. 
adherence to labour law) and opportunities to learn/share best practice with respect to 
legitimate competition. Other solutions included the use of private accreditation 
schemes (e.g. for temporary workers/agencies) which may be used to endorse the 
labour practices of a given company. This may be encouraged by both union and 
industry trade association formats (e.g. membership of FIEC was seen as a proxy for a 
willingness to learn good practice and rule adherence).  
Other novel forms of industry-specific accreditation include forms of ‘white listing’ (e.g. 
in the case of Italy). This involves cooperation between employer’s associations and the 
labour inspectorate, with the use of a ‘white list’ to indicate those companies seen to 
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comply with labour rules, social security compliance and so forth. Such companies may 
be more likely to win public contracts in future. This was seen as an important 
mechanism discrete from union responsibilities, bearing in mind posted workers are 
usually not members of trade unions.  
Box 7: SNCU26 
One example of non-government efforts to improve regulation is provided by the 
SNCU (the Dutch bipartite foundation responsible for enforcing compliance with 
collective labour agreements) which signed a collective agreement on behalf of the 
agency work industry in 2017. SNCU were created in 2004 during the conclusion of 
the collective agreement for the temporary sector. Its partners include trade unions 
in the sector and the main employers’ associations (ABU and NBBU). The group aim 
to provide information and guidance to user undertakings, temporary agency workers 
and agencies on provisions based on the collective agreement for the sector. In 
addition, the SNCU play an important role in raising awareness of rights and 
obligations of agency workers more generally.  
The SNCU utilise specialised non-Government ‘private inspectors’ and verification 
enterprises to check for adherence to collective agreements covering agency workers. 
They also ensure monitoring for compliance of other applicable provisions and 
conditions.  
As noted with respect to chain liability, efforts to encourage chain accountability are 
stronger in certain Member States (e.g. Italy and Spain). In Spain subcontract 
arrangements are limited to a maximum of three levels before a justification is required. 
This is one potential means of tackling labour abuses linked to the ‘fissuring’ of the 
workplace across subcontracted-chain networks (Weil, 2014). Links between non-
government institutions (e.g. trade unions) are viewed as important in flagging the use 
of subcontractors and potentially bogus variants of these. The linking of both 
government and non-government enforcement efforts are thus encouraged.  
  
                                           
26 The World Employment Confederation-Europe (WEC-Europe), which represents labour market 
enablers in 29 countries, has explored the role of non-government initiatives in upholding labour 
laws and standards. The group have underlined the employment industry’s own role in 
implementing social innovation, as well as the provision of training and security schemes for 
agency workers. This includes an acknowledged role for bipartite agreements to improve worker 




6 Inspection and enforcement in practice 
Key question: 
 How is undeclared activity driven by the use of letterbox companies best 
identified and investigated? 
 How can improved coordination and detection of letterbox companies be 
encouraged across borders? 
 How can cooperation with tax authorities or other enforcement bodies help the 
detection of letterbox companies? 
6.1 Identifying and inspecting letterbox companies 
In most Member States surveyed, the unlawful use of letterbox companies was most 
commonly identified through inspections. Respondents also advised that inspections and 
the investigations/analysis of administrative databases is the most effective means of 
following up letterbox investigations. A persistent frustration observed at the Seminar 
was a perceived inability to uphold worker rights vis-à-vis companies which are formally 
based in the jurisdictions of other Member States.  
Survey results suggest a variety of organisations in Member States are responsible for 
identifying and addressing letterbox company activity. Almost all Member States’ 
representatives indicated that responsible organisations operate in domains of labour 
law and social security (88%), while 82% advised the use of tax law was required in 
addressing letterbox company activity. It is likely, then, that cooperation is required 
between these distinct authorities/institutions in monitoring and tackling letterbox 
companies. Survey results suggest that most countries have cooperation mechanisms 
in place between relevant institutions for tackling letterbox companies (67%). Almost 
all Member State respondents reported some collaboration between the Labour 
Inspectorate, Social Security institutions and/or Tax and Revenue institutions. Certain 
other agencies were also mentioned, including police/specific crime units27 (i.e. in cases 
involving economic/financial crimes) and bodies responsible for migration28. Several 
Member States reported a lack of cooperation between departments, including Italy, 
Portugal, Croatia, Malta and Luxembourg. 
Box 8: Inspection process: Example from Belgium 
In Belgium the identification of letterbox companies is achieved through a range of 
methods.  
 Employees and self-employed workers are subject to extended interviews and 
the use of sector-specific questionnaires (e.g. focussed on transport, 
construction and meat processing sectors).  
 The Belgian client company is investigated for contracts and relevant 
paperwork. Extended interviews take place with managers and supervisors at 
the company.  
 The social partners are informed in risk-related sectors and companies. In 
Belgium sectoral agreements include meetings between social partners and 
inspectorates on the subject of labour risks and undeclared work which take 
place two-three times per year29.    
                                           
27 EL, ES, BE, SE, DK 
28 BE, SE, DK 
29 Under the Plan for Fair Competition the social partners have an agreed to inform 
inspectorates of potential labour violations in their sector. This includes discussion of 
potential risks regarding undeclared work and problems surrounding the use of posted 
workers. There is also a website to file complaints and spur future inspections:   
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 Cooperation with other (federal) inspection services (e.g. tax department). 
 Federal and local police engage in investigations when demanded by the 
prosecution office 
 In the case of posted workers, the Internal Market Information (IMI) system is 
used to circulate information with foreign labour inspection services. 
Belgium has a criminal approach to tackling foreign letterbox companies. The 
inspectorate sends cases to the labour prosecution office which utilises special 
investigation techniques to find evidence. This may involve house searches in Belgium 
and abroad and information sought through mechanisms ranging from phone tapping 
to requests for information and letters rogatory calling for judicial assistance. 
Survey feedback varied in detail but included a split between Member State 
representatives and social partner observers on the perceived effectiveness of 
enforcement mechanisms. There is evidence of a certain amount of joint operations (i.e. 
joint inspections) within Member States, though there is a lack of research on the 
specific goal of joint inspections in targeting letterbox arrangements linked to 
undeclared work.  
Many Member States do not have a definition of what constitutes a ‘genuine’ company 
under company law. In turn, while inspectorates may identify and address unlawful 
labour practices, inspectorates and other compliance offices commonly have no means 
or remit to test the wider question of company authenticity. Accordingly, inspectorates 
have neither the mandate to declare a letterbox company illegal, nor the power to 
withdraw it from the market in the majority of cases. Within the Seminar certain 
compliance officers voiced difficulties balancing a dual role of ‘policing’ and supporting 
workers who are the victims of letterbox arrangements. One participant advised that 
their inspectorate was considering the use of supporting individual criminal court cases 
as a means of prosecuting firms and bringing justice to employees.  
Several respondents agreed that inspectorates should act in a proactive (i.e. rather than 
reactive) fashion when investigating letterbox arrangements. As the workers affected 
are often vulnerable and lack knowledge on labour law entitlements, the victims of these 
arrangements are unlikely to seek justice on their own volition. In the absence of 
proactive inspection activity, combinations of media attention, investigative journalism 
and trade union pressure may be required to draw reactive attention to the problems 
created by letterbox companies (e.g. in the case of the meat sector in Germany, which 
uncovered conditions of human trafficking)30. Backing up case study research by the 
ETUC, the letterbox Seminar and associated resources are intended to spur proactive 
monitoring and enforcement activities and to strengthen the legal framework with 
respect to social security/labour law protections for posted workers.  
Certain Member States have devised effective partnership arrangements to better 
monitor and regulate the posting of workers between Member States. For example, in 
December 2014 a cooperation agreement was signed between the Labour Inspectorate 
of Estonia and the Division of Occupational Health and Safety of the Regional State 
Administrative Agency for South Finland, as described in Box 9, below.  
Box 9: Cooperation agreement between Estonia and Finland 
As reported at the Seminar, a working partnership between Estonia and Finland arose 
in response to the increasing number of Estonian posted workers in Finland (3,787 
out of a total of 6,327 in 2016 according to A1 statistics). Biannual meetings now take 
place between parties and efforts have been placed to raise awareness of Estonian 
workers posted to Finland (e.g. through media as a tool to raise awareness).  





The national administrations have also agreed to make each other’s inspection 
activities transparent to one another. This includes sending information and inspection 
reports regarding Estonian companies / companies where Estonian posted workers 
are located.  
In summary, Seminar participants underlined the need for holistic approaches to 
tackling undeclared work as linked to the use of letterbox companies (e.g. Williams, 
2016). This includes the use of mechanisms designed to increase the risk of detection 
and penalties (i.e. ‘sticks’) and the use of wider preventative and curative measures 
which act as ‘carrots’ to encourage legitimate employment practices (this includes for 
example changes to the rules on which Member State should pay social security 
contributions on posted workers).   
While most Member States have cooperation mechanisms in place between their Labour 
Inspectorate, Social Security institutions and/or Tax and Revenue institutions there was 
agreement among Seminar participants that more effective cooperation is required. 
Further challenges/barriers to a holistic approach to tackling letterbox firms include 
confusion over legal issues, a lack of data, inadequate resources for 
identifying/addressing activity and a lack of cooperation. This latter issue includes 
concerns over data sharing and/or a lack of formal cooperation between institutions. For 
example, the majority of respondents indicated that where cross-border cooperation 
mechanisms exist these are mainly bi-lateral mechanisms. Half of all respondents 




7 Key learning outcomes 
The need to define letterbox companies 
There is a lack of an accepted lay or legal definition of what constitutes a letterbox 
company in different Member States. Discussions were noted to include debate over 
whether or not letterbox companies are necessarily fraudulent by nature. There is 
widespread agreement that such structures are indeed being used to channel precarious 
workers into undeclared work arrangements which avoid taxation. This leads to a 
situation where workers’ rights that can be derived from genuine free movement in the 
EU are not respected. It can distort competition and endanger the legitimacy of the free 
movement principles.   
The need for coordination and cooperation between inspection institutions 
Improved coordination/cooperation between different inspection institutions within and 
between Member States is required to address the phenomenon of letterbox companies. 
For example, it is important for relevant tax authorities to share data with labour 
inspectorates when tackling the abuse of workers’ rights via letterbox arrangements. 
Enhanced enforcement campaigns with legitimised joint investigations, across 
disciplines and borders must be initiated and promoted.   
It is also important for Member States’ inspectorates to develop cooperative relations 
with one another. Discussions at the Seminar revealed that this is more likely when 
States develop ‘posting relationships’ with one another wherein workers are sent 
between countries (Estonian institutions, for example, have developed good relations 
with equivalents in Finland in recent years). On a general level the use of temporary 
and posted workers via agencies and bogus subsidiaries (including letterbox companies) 
has grown considerably across the EU in recent years. It is important to research and 
establish the patterns of worker flows between such institutions and react through 
coordinated efforts.  
Legislative change 
Legislative change is required on the posting of workers, including changes to the rules 
under which the coordination of social security payments between involved Member 
States is settled. For high risk sectors (i.e. those which often draw letterbox activity) 
the payment of social security contributions for posted workers could be made 
mandatory in the host state. This would ensure the proper deduction of social security 
contributions and provide an incentive for firms to only use posted workers when a 
genuine skills/labour gap has been identified. Member States could, therefore, develop 
a system of transfer and mutual contribution settlement which would erode the appeal 
of fraudulent letterbox companies as a source of posted workers. Member States known 
to receive or send posted workers to one another should develop cooperation 
mechanisms to help in the detection of letterbox companies and address labour rights 
abuses.   
Government and non-government solutions are required to address letterbox 
companies. Social partners’ involvement can be a key part of the policy; this includes a 
role for trade unions (e.g. in researching and reporting letterbox abuses) and trade 
associations (e.g. which may be capable of encouraging best practice and endorsing 
compliant firms). Forms of ‘white listing’ in sectors known to attract letterbox companies 
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